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AGGRESSIVE  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AGENCY  ACTION
CASS R.  SUNSTEIN*
In this essay, I undertake three tasks.  The first is to describe  some
of the difficulties of defining "benefits"  in the setting of judicial review of
administrative action.  The second task is to offer reasons, though tenta-
tive and largely anecdotal ones, for an affirmative answer to the question
whether  aggressive judicial review has produced "net  benefits."  At the
very least, I suggest, aggressive judicial review has had significant bene-
fits in many settings.  The third and final task is to outline some propos-
als  by  which  to  increase  the  benefits,  and  decrease  the  risks,  of  an
aggressive judicial posture in administrative law.
I.  THE  VARIOUS  "BENEFITS"  OF  JUDICIAL  REVIEW
For those assessing the value of judicial review of administrative  ac-
tion, the first problem is one of definition.  In this context, the criteria for
evaluation are elusive, and shift dramatically with context.  Even so, it is
possible to identify at least four different sets of criteria, all of which have
been invoked in recent discussion.'
A.  Legality.
The most obvious goal,  or "benefit,"  of judicial review is to increase
the incidence of legality.  Under this view, 2 judicial review of administra-
tive action is necessary above all to ensure that regulatory agencies  com-
ply  with  congressional  commands.  Far  from  being  an  enemy  of the
democractic process, judicial review  is its indispensable  ally, since it en-
sures administrative fidelity to public desires expressed in legislative com-
mands.  A major premise of this view is that implementing agencies have
an electoral pedigree  inferior to that of the Congress-the constitution-
*  Karl  N. Llewellyn  Professor of Jurisprudence,  Law  School  and  Department  of Political
Science,  University of Chicago.  This essay is a revised version of a talk delivered to the section on
administrative  law  of the Association  of American  Law  Schools in January  1989.
1.  See generally Cramton,  4 Comment on Trial-Type Hearings  in Nuclear  Power  Plant  Siting,
58 VA.  L. REV. 585,  591-93  (1972).
2.  See, eg., P. STRAUSS, AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  ADMINISTRATIVE  JUSTICE IN  THE  UNITED
STATES  261  (1989); see also F.A. VON  HAYEK,  THE CONSTITUTION  OF LIBERTY  153-54 (1960).Vol.  1989:522]  JUDICIAL  REVIEW COSTS AND BENEFITS  523
ally specified institution in the design of federal law.3
If legality is the goal of judicial review, active judicial review might
well be desirable.  There are good reasons to believe that courts have a
comparative  advantage  over agencies  in deciding what the law is.4  But
an increase in legality might not improve social welfare by, any measure.
A statute might be foolish, for example;  it might impose costs that out-
weigh any  benefits.  A possible  example  is the Delaney  Clause,5  which
forbids any carcinogens in food additives.  The prohibition applies to car-
cinogens  posing trivial  risks, and for that reason it has  the potential to
impose costs-including harms to health resulting from the substitution
of noncarcinogenic but risky substances for carcinogenic substances  pos-
ing  de minimis risks-that would dwarf its benefits.6' A  court that re-
quired literal compliance with the Delaney Clause might increase legality
but decrease net social benefits.
B.  Efficient Resource Allocation.
Under a second view, the goal of judicial review  is to promote effi-
cient resource allocation.7  The principal concern  here is that regulatory
3.  For criticism of this view, see Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political  Decisions, 1  J.L. EcON. & ORG.  81,  91-99 (1985)  (arguing for broad statutory delegation  of
authority to administrators).
4.  For a defense  of this proposition, see Sunstein,  Constitutionalism  After the New Deal, 101
HARV.  L. REv. 421, 464-69 (1987);  for critical discussion, see Diver, Statutory  Interpretation  in the
Administrative State,  133 U. PA.  L. REv. 549,  582-92  (1985)  (favoring interpretive  competence  of
agencies).
If the goal of judicial review  is  to promote legality,  an expansive interpretation  of Chevron,
U.S.A.,  Inc. v.  NRDC, 467 U.S.  837,  843  (1984)  (suggesting  that courts  should  defer to agency
interpretations of law when the statute is ambiguous  or when Congress has not "directly addressed
the precise question at issue"),  would be a serious mistake.  Courts could not defer to congressional
interpretations of ambiguous constitutional provisions  without grossly distorting basic principles of
separation of powers.  So too, judicial deference to agency views about "pure" questions of statutory
meaning  would  upset  longstanding principles  to the effect  that those  limited  by  legal  authority
should not be empowered to decide on the scope of the limitation.  Foxes, in short, should not guard
henhouses.  See Sunstein,  supra, at 464-69.
One  might emphasize  this point  while at the  same time agreeing that courts  should defer to
agency views when Congress has told them to do so, or to agency view.s on questions, including legal
questions, that  call for the  distinctive factfinding  and policymaking  competence  of the agency-a
point that supports the result in  Chevron itself.  A  respect for the judicial  role in deciding on  the
scope of an agency's  legal  authority, for  the agency's institutional  competence,  and  for Congress'
power to allocate  interpretive authority,  all appear  to underlie the discussion  in INS  v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421  (1987)-perhaps  the most sensible treatment  of these issues in  the last two
decades.
5.  Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929,  72 Stat. 1784 (1958)  (codified at
21  U.S.C. §§ 321,  331,  342,  346,  348, 451  (1982)).
6.  See Merrill,  FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause:  Repudiation of Congressional
Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?,  5 YALE J. ON  REG. 1 (1988).
7.  See Cramton, supra note  1, -at 592-93.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
agencies  might undertake action whose real-world benefits are exceeded
or even dwarfed by their real-world  costs, measured in economic terms.
In  these  circumstances,  judicial  review  might  serve  as  a  corrective.
Courts might, for example,  ensure against  excessive intervention in the
marketplace;  or  they might  compel  agencies  to  consider  the  effects  of
private  conduct-for  example,  pollution-whose  extremely  high  social
costs  are insufficiently  taken into account by the marketplace.
If the goal of judicial review is efficient resource allocation, that goal
might be promoted as a result of judicial invalidation of agency action or
inaction deemed  "arbitrary"  or "capricious."'8  But judicial promotion  of
efficient resource allocation may or may not overlap with other beneficial
goals, such as compliance with a statute ("legality").  Statutory require-
ments  sometimes  promote the goal  of efficient resource  allocation,  but
frequently  they are  directed  toward  other  ends,  and  in such  cases  the
promotion  of  legality  will  conflict  with  the  goal  of  efficient  resource
allocation.
C.  Real-  World Improvements of an Eclectic Sort.
A third conception of the purpose of judicial review also focuses on
real-world improvements, but selects a quite different set of goals.  Under
this view,9 courts  should not only promote better resource  allocation in
an economic sense, but might also, or even alternatively,  attempt to:  (a)
ensure a better distribution of wealth; (b) promote the various nonmarket
or noncommodity values contained in statutes that, for example, regulate
broadcasting  or protect endangered  species and the environment; 1 0  and
(c)  work  against  discrimination  directed  at  various  groups,  including
blacks,  women, and the handicapped.
On  this  view,  one  would  evaluate judicial  review  by  asking  if it
brings  about  these  various  goals.  Net  benefits  would  be  found  when
courts sensibly promote these goals;  net costs would be found if they fail
to do  so.  Here, too, the connection  between  legality in the sense  of ad-
herence to  statute and real-world improvements  is uncertain and some-
times  merely coincidental.  But since many  statutes are in fact designed
to promote goals of this sort, judicial efforts to ensure fidelity to law will
often also result in practical  changes  in this direction.
8.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982)  (directing judges to invalidate agency action found arbitrary or
capricious).
9.  Cf  C.  Sunstein,  The Regulatory  State chs.  1-2  (1989  draft) (discussing  diverse statutory
goals).
10.  See Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal  State: The Role of  Non-Commodity Values, 92  YALE
L.J.  1537  (1983).
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D.  Legitimacy.
Under the traditional view, associated most closely with the work of
Kenneth  Culp  Davis  and  Louis  Jaffe,  the basic  function  of the courts
might be described  as the promotion of "legitimacy"  in the administra-
tive  process.11  This  is  an ill-defined  concept, but it  is  associated with
such conventional notions as ensurance of legality, protection against ar-
bitrariness  and  selectivity, promotion  of procedural  regularity,  and  en-
surance  against  the twin  evils  of factional  tyranny  and  self-interested
representation.  A particular fear of this view is that well-organized  pri-
vate  groups  ("special  interests")  often  have  disproportionate  influence
over administrative processes-a phenomenon that provides the basic in-
sight behind the extensive literature on agency  "capture." 12
This  view  places  great  emphasis  on judicial  independence,  which
serves  as  an  important safeguard,  providing  both  an ex  ante  deterrent
and  as  an  ex  post  check  against  the  domination  of  administrative
processes  by  irrelevant  or  illegitimate  considerations.  On  this  view,
moreover,  an aggressive judicial role is  necessary  in  order to introduce
some of the traditional virtues of Anglo-American law into the adminis-
trative process.  Here, as with the goal of legality, the "benefits"  of judi-
cial review are not evaluated directly in terms of its consequences  for the
world.  The goals of judicial review are of a more diffuse sort, and have
no necessary  or linear connection with good regulatory outcomes.
Both critical and  approving  evaluations  of the judicial process  are
often confused by a failure  to distinguish  among these various  criteria.
Thus, for example, courts have been criticized  for adhering to statutory
text at society's expense, and at the same time for promoting social wel-
fare at the expense of the statutory text.1 3  Courts might do an excellent
job of promoting fidelity to law, but at the same time, and perhaps  as a
direct  result, bring  about  a  less sensible  system  of regulation.  By  the
same token, courts might introduce necessary regulatory controls but do
so with a weak or uncertain statutory warrant.
In assessing judicial  review,  then,  it  is important  to be careful  to
spell out the relevant criteria.  While selection of those criteria is a value-
11.  See K. DAVIS,  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE  § 29.1 (2d ed.  1979); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL  OF  ADMINISTRATIVE  ACTION  (1965).
12.  See generally THE  POLITICS  OF  REGULATION  (J.  Wilson  ed.  1981)  (collection  of essays
seeking to determine how regulatory agencies ordinarily operate and develop  to their degree of influ-
ence by private powers);  P.  QUIRK,  INDUSTRY  INFLUENCE  IN  FEDERAL  REGULATORY  AGENCIES
(1981)  (addressing  incentives  acting  on  regulatory  agencies  to  adopt  pro-industry  policies);  K.
SCHLOZMAN  & J.  TIERNEY,  ORGANIZED  INTERESTS  AND  AMERICAN  DEMOCRACY  (1986).
13.  An example is R. MELNICK,  REGULATION  AND THE  COURTS:  THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT (1983)  (examining how federal courts have influenced  policymaking in the regulation of air
pollution),  which, despite its numerous virtues,  suffers from this problem.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
laden task, it is probably fair to say that both courts and observers have
paid less attention than they should to the effects of judicial review on the
real world of regulation--effects  that are crucial to an evaluation  of the
judicial role.  It is in large part because of our considerable ignorance on
this score  that the study  of administrative  law  remains  in  a  primitive
state.
II.  THE  "NET BENEFITS"  PRODUCED  BY  AGGRESSIVE
JUDICIAL  REVIEW
Whatever the relevant criteria, it is difficult to make confident state-
ments in the abstract, about the benefits  and costs  of aggressive judicial
review of administrative action.  It is surely imaginable, in certain times
and places, that aggressive judicial review will both increase illegality and
decrease social welfare  on any view.  Indeed, one could  argue that this
was precisely the pattern in the period immediately before and after the
New Deal,  when courts invoked a principle calling for narrow construc-
tion of regulatory power.14
More recently,  aggressive judicial review  has  produced  regulatory
irrationality in a variety of areas.  Professor Mashaw has shown that the
courts'  simultaneous hospitality  toward  administrative recalls  of defec-
tive vehicles and hostility toward ex ante motor vehicle regulation  have
pushed automobile  safety regulation  in peculiar directions.  The net re-
sult tends toward  regulation  through  random,  ex post directives  rather
than  through  managerially  coherent,  ex  ante  controls.1 5  In  the  same
vein, the  courts'  literal  approach  to  the Delaney  Clause  has  increased
regulatory  irrationality  by  imposing  serious  costs  and  in fact  bringing
about fewer rather than more improvements in safety and health.' 6
On the other hand, it is fully imaginable that aggressive judicial re-
view will both increase legality  and improve social  welfare.  Commenta-
tors can invoke considerations  at a high level of generality that bear on
this problem, and indeed such considerations form the staple of academic
14.  See, eg.,  FTC v. Eastman Kodak  Co.,  274 U.S.  619,  625  (1927)  (Commission had no au-
thority to require company to divest labs acquired before action by Commission); FTC v. Gratz, 253
U.S.  421, 427 (1920)  (meaning of "unfair method of competition"  is for the courts, not the Commis-
sion, to determine).  See generally Fordham & Leach, Interpretation  of Statutes in Derogation of the
Common Law, 3 VAND.  L.  REV.  438 (1950)  (noting  increasing  reliance  on  statutes  rather  than
common  law), and cases  cited therein.
15.  See Mashaw & Harsft, Regulation and  Legal Culture: The Case of  Motor Vehicle Safety, 4
YALE  J. ON  REG.  257, 263  (1987)  (arguing  that judicial  review  is  a  cause of National  Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's shift from rules to  recalls).
16.  See, e-g.,'Public  Citizen  v. Young,  831  F.2d  1108,  1111-22 (D.C. Cir.  1987), cert. denied,
108  S. Ct.  1470 (1988)  (Delaney Clause does  not contain an implicit de minimus exception;  FDA
listing decisions for Orange No. 17,  with cancer risk of I in  19 billion,  and Red No. 19,  with cancer
risk of I in 9 million,  must be changed).
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debates on these matters.  Judicial lack of accountability, the judges' ig-
norance  of the often complex matters  at hand, the delays and formality
built into the litigation process,  and the courts  ad hoc,  case-by-case  ap-
proach to regulatory  issues  are  certainly  likely  to impair judicial  per-
formance  in  overseeing  administration.'
7   At  the  same  time, judicial
independence  might serve as  a protection  against  the various  pressures
that produce  administrative  illegality,  injustice,  and irrationality. 18  In
recent years,  there has been  extensive  documentation  of the distorting
effects of various  pressures  placed  on regulators. 19  Such  evidence  pro-
vides at least a plausible basis to believe that courts, precisely because of
their  independence,  will  provide  a  crucial  deterrent  and  ex  post
corrective.
2 0
Pitched  at this level  of generality,  however,  considerations  of this
sort are unlikely to be conclusive.  Much will depend on context-on the
particular substantive area and on the incentives, good faith, and compe-
tence of  judges and administrators at any particular time.  An evaluation
of how  these considerations have  in fact played  out over the past, say,
fifty years must await  extensive empirical  investigation.
Even in the absence of a systematic treatment, however, it is possible
to point to  reasons to  believe that aggressive judicial  review,  evaluated
under any criterion, has been desirable in many contexts.  Aggressive re-
view serves as a powerful ex ante deterrent to lawless or irrational agency
behavior.  In some  settings,  it also  strengthens  both  analytic  processes
and accountability  to superiors  within agencies.21  In this sense, judicial
review should be evaluated in terms of its systemic consequences for the
administrative process,  which takes  place in the shadow  of judicial  re-
view.  Those consequences  frequently  have been desirable,  above all be-
cause  of the in  terroram  effect of the prospect of judicial scrutiny.  A
brief look at recent Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports on
17.  See  Diver, supra note  4, at 592-93  (finding  that on  whole  agencies  are better  statutory
interpreters than courts); Stewart, The Discontents of  Legalisr: Interest Group Relations in Adminis-
trative  Regulation, 1985 Wisc. L. REv. 655, 678-82 (litigation in administrative context causes delay
and uncertainty).
18.  See Pedersen, Formal  Records and Informal  Rulemaking, 85  YALE  L.J. 38,  59-60  (1975)
(judicial review  of regulatory decisions would  establish precedents for future rule-writers);  Stewart,
The Development of  Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional  Law in Judicial  Review of  Environmen-
tal  Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA  L. REv. 713,  762-63  (1977). (review-
ing courts,  unencumbered  with  specialized  institutional  missioi,  play an  indispensable  corrective
role); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 463-78.
19.  See supra note  12;  see also Olson,  The  Quiet Shift of Power:  Office  of Management &
Budget Supervision of EPA Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA.  J. NAT. RESOURcES
L. 1, 40 (1984).
20.  See supra text following note  12.
21.  See R. MELNICK, supra note  13,  at 379  (notwithstanding  Melnick's  quite critical view of
the role of the courts in environmental  law); Pedersen, supra note  18,  at 59-60.528  DUKE LAW  JOURNAL  [Vol.  1989:522
the regulatory programs of the United States demonstrates that judicial
decrees are important in producing  executive compliance with law.22
It is  also possible to  show that aggressive judicial  review  has often
provided significant benefits  both in bringing about desirable regulatory
initiatives and in preventing unreasonable or unlawful regulation.  Exam-
ples are numerous, and indeed on balance extraordinary.  Judicial initia-
tives  helped  bring  about  regulation  of  DDT23  and  airborne  lead24;
control of asbestos, beryllium,  and mercury25; regulation of atmospheric
loading, which  produces  acid  deposition,26 disclosure  requirements  for
hazardous chemicals27; and regulation in the workplace of ethylene oxide
and formaldehyde.28  The federal courts also prevented  the government
from eliminating passive restraint rules.29  The Supreme Court's invalida-
tion of an extremely hasty and ill-considered decision to scrap those rules
will  ultimately  save  many  lives.  In the  areas  of communications  and
broadcasting, an aggressive judiciary has helped ensure high quality pro-
gramming, diversity, local control,  and sensitivity to the interests of mi-
nority groups.30  In addition, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(PSD)  program--calling  for, among other things,  protection  of pristine
areas from environmental degradation-is a product of an aggressive fed-
eral court.
31
22.  See,  eg.,  OFFICE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AND  BUDGET,  EXECUTIVE  OFFICE  OF  THE  PRESI-
DENT, REGULATORY  PROGRAM  OF THE  UNITED STATES  GOVERNMENT 50, (Apr. 1, 1986-Mar. 31,
1987)  [hereinafter  REGULATORY  PROGRAM  OF THE  UNITED  STATES  GOVERNMENT]  (discussing
Department of Commerce amendments to the Coastal Zone Management  Act in order to conform to
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S.  312 (1984), which held federal sale of outer continen-
tal shelf oil and gas leases not activity directly affecting  coastal zone within meaning of § 307(c)(2)).
See generally REGULATORY  PROGRAM  OF THE UNITED  STATES,  1985-90 (filled  with illustrations of
regulatory initiatives undertaken  because of judicial  compulsion).
23.  Environmental Defense  Fund v. Ruckelshaus,  439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
24.  NRDC v. Train, 545  F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
25.  Environmental Defense  Fund v. Ruckelshaus,  3  Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.  L. Inst.)  S 20,  173
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
26.  NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.  1974), rev'd, 421  U.S.  60 (1975).
27.  United Steel Workers v. Pendergrass,  819 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. granted,  109 S.  Ct.
2061  (1989).
28.  Public Citizen  Health Research  Group v. Tyson,  796 F.2d  1479,  1507  (D.C. Cir,  1986);
International  Union,  UAW v. Donovan,  590 F. Supp.  747,  753  (D.D.C. 1984).
29.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs.  Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.  Co., 463 U.S. 29, 38,  57  (1983)
("[E]ach year an estimated 9,000  more lives  will be saved,  and tens of thousands of serious injuries
will be prevented  [because  of the passive restraint requirement].").
30.  See Stewart, supra note  10, at 1582.
31.  See, eg.,  Sierra  Club v. Ruckelshaus,  344 F. Supp.  253, 256 (D.D.C. 1972) (granting  pre-
liminary injunction to prevent EPA approval of state plans that would allow air pollution  to rise to
secondary levels pursuant  to the Clean Air Act of  1970).  As we will  see, the  PSD program  is far
from perfect, see infra notes 46-52 and accompanying  text; but the basic idea of protecting  pristine
areas is sound.Vol.  1989:522]  JUDICIAL REVIEW COSTS  AND BENEFITS  529
In addition to bringing about regulatory initiatives that are desira-
ble, courts have played an important role in ensuring against overzealous
or  irrational  regulation.  Here  too,  the  aggregate  picture  is  quite  ex-
traordinary and reveals judicial  protections  against many  ill-considered
intrusions.  For example,  courts have invalidated  an indefensible  secon-
dary standard for sulfur dioxide;32 struck down draconian regulation of
the automobile33 and cement industries;34 required a quite sensible show-
ing of a "significant  risk"  before  OSHA may regulate  the workplace; 35
and invalidated extremely aggressive transportation control plans written
by the EPA.
36
Examples  of this sort amount to  little more than  anecdotes.  This
can hardly  dispose of the issue.  But they  are highly  suggestive.  They
indicate that a world without aggressive judicial review might well suffer
from  increases  in lawlessness,  carelessness,  overzealous  regulatory con-
trols, and inadequate  regulatory protection.  Aggressive judicial review
has  produced  important ex  ante  and ex  post benefits  in numerous  set-
tings;  and although the evidence  is  largely anecdotal  and  far from sys-
tematic,  it must  suffice  absent  a  more  sustained  investigation  into the
issue.
III.  PROPOSED  PRINCIPLES  TO INCREASE  "NET  BENEFITS"
We have seen that it is difficult to say in the abstract whether aggres-
sive judicial  review of administrative  action has produced,  or will pro-
duce, significant advantages.  In these circumstances,  a major task is to
develop principles of interpretation that will improve the situation.  Pub-
lic law thus far lacks a set of interpretive norms that are well-adapted to
the purposes, operation, and occasional failures of regulatory legislation.
For this reason, the area of statutory construction of administrative be-
havior remains undeveloped.  In this section, I outline, in summary fash-
ion,  some  principles  that  courts  might  bring  to  bear  on  regulatory
32.  See Kennecott Copper  Corp.  v. EPA, 462 F.2d  846,  850-51  (D.C. Cir. 1972)  (remand to
agency  for further explanation of basis for secondary air quality standard for sulfur oxides).
33.  International  Harvester Co.  v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d  615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
34.  Portland  Cement Ass'n  v. Ruckelshaus,  486 F.2d 375  (D.C.  Cir. 1973),  cert. denied, 417
U.S.  921  (1974).
35.  See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO  v. American Petroleum Inst.,  448 U.S.  607, 642-62
(1980)  (remanding  benzene regulation  for determination  whether benzene  use poses  significant risk
under OSHA); see also Rose-Ackerman, Progressive  Law and Economics-and  the New Administra-
tive Law, 98 YALE  L.J. 341,  364-66 (1988)  (supporting part of analysis in Industrial  Union Dep't).
36.  See South Terminal  Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,  665-67,  670,  681-82 (1st Cir. 1974) (ap-
proval of EPA emissions  standards denied  pending  further hearings on the technical basis  for the
standards); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 308,  315-16,  318, 320-22 (5th Cir. 1974)  (finding arbitrary
and  capricious some aspects of EPA response to Texas' air quality implementation plan), cert. de-
nied, 427 U.S.  905 (1976).DUKE LAW JOURNAL
problems. 37  Most of these principles, which might be embodied  in clear
statements principles  or interpretive  "canons,"  already  have  some sup-
port in existing law.
A.  Proportionality.
Statutes should be construed so that the aggregate social benefits are
proportionate  to the aggregate  social  costs.  This  principle,  implicit  in
some of the recent cases,38 recognizes that a proportionality principle will
likely produce sensible regulation and therefore  is the appropriate under-
standing to attribute to Congress under normal circumstances.  The prin-
ciple also recognizes  that well-organized  groups are  sometimes  able  to
obtain legislation  that would not  be the outcome  of a  well-functioning
deliberative  process;  that bureaucratic  incentives  can press  agencies  in
the direction of overzealous  enforcement; that the statutory text is some-
times an impulsive reaction to short-term problems; that temporary pub-
lic concern  can result in hasty drafting;  and that Congress is not able to
focus on all applications of statutory standards.  The purpose of the pro-
portionality principle is to ensure that in the absence of a clear legislative
statement, statutes are  understood  to impose  costs  commensurate  with
their benefits.  Under this view, of course, costs and benefits need not be
measured  technically,  in  accordance  with  the  willingness-to-pay  crite-
rion,  but instead  would  be  assessed  in  accordance  with  looser  under-
standings about proportionality.
The proportionality principle has played a role in two important re-
cent decisions.  In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute, the Supreme Court interpreted the toxic substances  provision
of the  Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Act to  require  a  showing  of a
"significant  risk"  before  the Secretary  of Labor  can regulate  toxic sub-
stances.3 9  The plurality referred explicitly to the problem of de minimis
health  benefits  imposed  for  huge  expense.40  In NRDC v.  EPA,  the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
EPA could take account of economic and technological feasibility in set-
ting  the "margin  of safety"  for hazardous  pollutants.41  Here  too  the
court expressed concern  that an alternative interpretation might require
37.  A  much  more detailed treatment  of this problem  can  be  found in a  forthcoming  article,
Sunstein, Interpreting  Statutes  in the Regulatory  State, 103 HARV.  L. REv. (forthcoming  1989) and a
forthcoming book,  C. SUNSTEIN,  THE REGULATORY  STATE (1989  draft).  Both deal with numerous
interpretive principles with which to approach  regulatory statutes.
38.  See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, 448  U.S. at 639-59; NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
39.  448 U.S. at 639-40.
40.  Id. at 645.
41.  824 F.2d  1146,  1163  (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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regulation that was irrational because it imposed enormous costs for min-
imal gains.42
Both of these decisions can be understood  as responsive to the fact
that stringent statutory requirements  tend to bring about a paradoxical
regime of simultaneous over-regulation  and under-regulation.  When the
statute  does  not  contain  a  proportionality  principle,  agencies  tend  to
over-regulate those substances that get on the agenda; but they are simul-
taneously reluctant to regulate  many substances  at all,  which therefore
go  entirely  uncontrolled.  One  consequence  of draconian  standards  is
thus to leave the marketplace unregulated in many settings.43  A propor-
tionality principle  is a useful corrective.
B.  De Minimis Exceptions.
It follows  from  the  proportionality  principle  that  administrators
should generally be authorized to refuse to impose costly regulations for
highly  speculative or minimal  gains."4  Many  courts  have  reached  pre-
cisely this conclusion, holding that in the absence of a clear congressional
statement, administrators may make de minimis exceptions to regulatory
controls.45  Indeed, courts probably should require such exceptions in the
absence of explicit statutory text or plausible substantive justifications to
the contrary.
42.  Id.  at 1163.66.
43.  See J. MENDELOFF,  THE DILEMMA  OF ToxIc  SUBSTANCE  REGULATION:  How  OVER-
REGULATION CAUSES  UNDERREGULATION  AT OSHA 90-99 (1988);  Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35,
at 361-64.
44.  Courts have reached somewhat conflicting conclusions on this point, although  the general
background  rule seems to be in favor of de minimis exceptions.  See Public Citizen v. Young,  831
F.2d  1108,  1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987)  (Delaney  Clause does not contain  implicit de minimis exception
for carcinogenic dyes), cerL denied, 108 S.Ct. 1470 (1988);  Alabama Power Co.  v. Costle,  636 F.2d
323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979)  (courts should be reluctant to apply literal terms of statute to mandate
pointless  expenditures  of effort); Monsanto  Co. v. Kentucky,  613  F.2d  947,  954 (D.C. Cir.  1979)
(statutory scheme permits de minimis exceptions  in situations that clearly present no public  health
or safety  concerns).  See generally Gilhooley,  Plain Meaning, Absurd Results and the Legislative
Purpose: The Interpretation  of  the Delaney Clause, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 267  (1988)  (examining rejec-
tion of de minimis exception to the Delaney  Clause).
45.  See Bowen  v.  Yuckert, 482  U.S.  137  (1987)  (severity  regulation);  Coalition  on  Sensible
Transp.,  Inc. v. Dole,  826 F.2d  60,  63  (D.C. Cir. 1987)  (end  use statute broad enough  to include
minimal "uses"  of parkland); Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120,  126 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (agency has broad discretion to waive the statutory requirement of producing an Environ-
ment  Impact Statement);  Alabama  Power  Co. v.  Costle,  636  F.2d at  360 (EPA may  exempt  de
minimis situations).  See generally Fiksel, Toward a De Minimis Policy in Risk Regulation, 5  RISK
ANALYSIS  257  (1985)  (discussing the use of de minimis risk  threshold in the OSHA  Regulation of
benzene and proposing a series of fundamental  principles and societal objectives to be considered in
setting similar thresholds);  Mumpower, An Analysis of the De Minimis Strategy for Risk Manage-
ment, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 437  (1986)  (analysis of risks and risk management decisions should include
both old and new  risks, as  well as organizational,  institutional, political,  and societal  factors).DUKE LAW JOURNAL
C.  Understanding  Systemic Effects.
Regulation  is  frequently  unsuccessful,  or  less  successful  than  it
should be, because of a legislative or administrative failure to understand
the complex  systemic effects  of governmental  controls.  The  problem of
perverse unintended consequences is a pervasive one.46  A similar failure
has undermined interpretive  efforts by the federal courts.  Consider, for
example, the court's creation-in  the face of an ambiguous text-of the
"prevention of significant deterioration"  (PSD) program in Sierra Club v.
Ruckleshaus.47  In that  case, the court  ruled that state implementation
plans  under  the  Clean  Air  Act 48  must  include  provisions  not  merely
complying with national air quality standards, but also designed  to pre-
vent the degradation of air currently cleaner than required by those stan-
dards.49  One of the  court's  apparent  goals  was  to ensure  that  federal
environmental  policy  would  protect  visibility  in  currently  pristine  ar-
eas.50  While its decision has promoted that goal to some degree, it also
has  been  immensely  expensive,  has  delayed  the  substitution  of  low-
sulphur western coal for high-sulfur eastern coal, and has perversely pro-
tected dirty existing plants against replacement with cleaner new ones.51
It is  far from  clear that the environment  is better  off as a  result.  The
Sierra Club court  was unaware  of these  effects.  Because  the  statutory
basis for the  decision  was  quite thin, an understanding  of the environ-
mental  and  nonenvironmental  costs  associated  with  the  PSD  program
might well have led to a narrower or even contrary result.
Similar examples are provided by the Supreme Court's OSHA deci-
sions, in which the Court, or several of its members, appeared to assume
that  greater  protection  for  workers  would  follow  automatically  from
more stringent statutory requirements.5 2  As we have seen,  this assump-
tion  disregards  the  fact  that  stringent  requirements  tend  to  lead  an
agency  not to  regulate  at all,  thus producing  under-regulation.  It also
46.  See,  e.g.,  J.  MENDELOFF,  supra note  43,  at  4-8  (describing  how  over-regulation  causes
under-regulation);  R. CRANDALL,  REGULATING  THE AUTOMOBILE  5 (1986)  (discussing how regu-
lation of new cars keeps old dirty cars on road longer);  R. CRANDALL,  CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL
POLLUTION:  THE  ECONOMICS  AND  POLITICS  OF CLEAN  AIR 41  (1984)  (discussing ways  in which
regulation of new sources perpetuates  dirty sources).
47.  344 F. Supp. 253  (D.D.C. 1972).
48.  42 U.S.C.  §§ 7401(b)(1), 7410 (1982).
49.  344 F. Supp.  at 256.
50.  See R. MELNICK, supra note  13, at 81  (most frequently mentioned goal is to protect visibil-
ity in pristine areas).
51.  See id. at 76.
52.  See supra note 35;  see also American  Textile Mfrs.  Inst.,  Inc.  v. Donovan, 452  U.S.  490,
54041  (1982)  (OSHA  places pre-eminent  value  on safe  and  healthful  workplace,  limited  only  by
feasibilty).
[Vol.  1989:522Vol.  1989:522]  JUDICIAL REVIEW COSTS AND BENEFITS  533
ignores  the  risk that such  requirements  might  impose  costs  that  ulti-
mately will be borne by workers  themselves.
In short, courts dealing with regulatory issues commonly misunder-
stand  the systemic  effects  of administrative  controls,  and  act  as if the
decision will create only ex post winners and losers in the particular case.
This misunderstanding leads to statutory construction that is uninformed
by the real-world impact of regulation-and the real-world impact, while
not by itself decisive, is frequently  relevant  to the question of statutory
meaning.
D.  Cautious  Approach to Legislative History.
Legislative history is sometimes written by one or another side in a
dispute over the content of the law, and the history will sometimes reflect
a view whose advocates  were unable to prevail during congressional  de-
liberations.5 3  Moreover,  Congress  enacts  laws,  not  the  comments  of
some of its members  about what those laws mean.  All this supports a
firm  principle  in  favor  of  the  priority  of  statutory  text  to  statutory
history.
Properly understood, this principle does not call on courts to disre-
gard the history, but counsels them to give the history limited weight in
cases  of  arguable  conflict.  Consider,  for  example,  section  111  of the
Clean Air Act,54 an ambiguous provision that could be interpreted to call
for administrative  concentration  on environmental  benefits,  but whose
conference report language suggests an effort-unsuccessful  in Congress
as  a whole-to  convert  the environmental  laws  into  protectionism  for
eastern coal producers.5 5  A court that accorded great weight to the his-
tory to clarify ambiguous  text might well have permitted the conference
report to bring about that conversion.  But a court that accepted the pri-
ority of the text would  interpret it to  ensure against a statutory "deal"
destructive  of both the environment and the economy.
E.  Coordination.
It should come as no surprise that the post-New Deal proliferation
of regulatory programs has led to inconsistency  and sometimes incoher-
ence in the law.  For example, the standards  for regulating carcinogens
53.  For  a  vivid  example,  see  B.  ACKERMAN  &  W.  HASSLER,  CLEAN  COAL/DIRTY  AIR  52
(1981);  see also the discussion by Justice Scalia in Scalia, Judicial  Deference to Administrative Inter-
pretations  of  Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 510-12; see generally INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,  480 U.S.  421, 452-
54 (1987)  (concurrence  by  Scalia  on congressional  intent  and  agency  interpretation  of statutory
language).
54.  42 U.S.C.  § 7401 (1982).
55.  See B. ACKERMAN,  & W. HASSLER, supra note 53,  at 30-33.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
are notoriously variable, calling for excessive controls in some areas and
unduly weak regulation in others.5 6  The absence of centralization has led
to regulatory failures in numerous areas.57
A partial  solution  would call  on courts  to  employ clear  statement
principles of statutory construction so as to help bring about consistency
and coordination in the law.  A judicial role of this sort has clear prece-
dent both in the old idea that statutes governing the same subject matter
should be construed together58 and in contemporary  administrative law.
In Bob Jones University v. United  States, for example, the Supreme Court
held that the Internal Revenue Service could not grant tax deductions to
private schools that discriminate on the basis of race.5 9  The source of the
prohibition was a statute giving deductions to institutions serving chari-
table purposes, but with an implicit exception when  "public  policy"  re-
quires denial of the deduction.  There is no doubt that, when the statute
was initially enacted, "public policy" did not prohibit deductions to insti-
tutions that discriminated  on the basis of race.  Racial discrimination in
education  was common  at the time, and  it could not  plausibly  be sug-
gested  that the enacting  Congress  thought that discriminatory  schools
violated public policy.  The Bob Jones decision  is best understood  as an
effort to ensure that the IRS takes account of the widespread  social  an-
tagonism toward racial discrimination,  since that antagonism now forms
a part of the general thrust of contemporary "public policy."  The under-
lying idea was that the statute  should be construed  in a way  that con-
forms  to current  views about racial  discrimination  in education.  Some
cases limiting agency  authority to impose significant costs for uncertain
or speculative benefits can be understood in similar terms, as an effort to
bring about coherence in the law and conformity with current norms and
practices.
60
56.  See REGULATORY  PROGRAM  OF THE UNITED  STATES, supra note  22,  at 259-60  (OSHA
changes to Carcinogen Policy (29 C.F.R.  1990) in light of the "different  approaches"  to "regulatory
requirements for research laboratories and the construction, agriculture, and maritime industries").
57.  See, eg., Huber, Electricity  and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority,  100
HARv.  L. REv.  1002,  1003  (1987);  R. KATZMAN,  INSTITUTIONAL  DISABILITY  1 (1985).
58.  See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic  Rivers Ass'n, 426  U.S.  776,  789-93  (1976)  (reconciling
the National  Environmental  Policy Act with  the Disclosure  Act); Sanford  v. Commissioner,  308
U.S. 39, 42 (1939)  (finding the federal gift tax supplementary to the estate tax); Preston State Bank v.
Ainsworth,  552 F. Supp.  578,  580 (N.D.  Tex.  1982)  (ruling that the  bank names provision  of the
National  Banking Act complements  but does  not preempt  a Texas  unfair compensation  statute);
Daigneault  v. Public Fin. Corp.  562 F. Supp.  194,  196 (D.R.I.  1983) (aligning allegedly conflicting
provisions of the Truth in Lending Act); Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs.,  504 F. Supp.
1244,  1255-58 (N.D.  Ill. 1981)  (construing various amendments  of handicapped  discrimination stat-
ute to assess responsibility  for student aides), aff'd, 689 F.2d 724  (1982).
59.  Bob Jones Univ. v. United  States, 461  U.S.  574  (1983).
60.  See, eg.,  Industrial  Union Dep't, AFL-CIO  v. American  Petroleum  Inst.,  448  U.S.  607,
608  (1980)  (restricting  the authority of the Secretary  of Labor to impose elevated  standards for  a
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F.  Obsolescence.
A large problem for modem regulation is that of obsolescence-stat-
utory requirements that are inconsistent with new developments of fact,
policy, and law.  Statutes may no longer be consistent with widely held
social norms.  The legal background may have changed dramatically as a
result of judicial and legislative innovations; the factual assumptions un-
derlying  an  old  statute may no longer  hold.  In all  of these  cases, the
question  is  whether  changing  circumstances  justify  a  change  in
interpretation.
In the  areas  of banking,  broadcasting,  and  carcinogen  regulation,
judicial interpretation has sometimes been a straightforward response to
changed circumstances. 61  Here it is implausible to resolve statutory am-
biguities by asking how  Congress would  have answered  the question  at
the time  of enactment.  In light  of the changed nature  of the relevant
markets, such an approach  would be a recipe  for absurdity.  At least if
the language so permits,  there is no alternative  but to extrapolate  pur-
poses at a certain  level of generality and to assess the changed  circum-
stances in light of those purposes.
Consider,  as a  particular example,  the problem of interpreting  the
Delaney Clause.62  As was seen, the Clause contains a general prohibition
on the use of substances that "induce"  cancer as food additives, and was
enacted in a period when carcinogens could be detected  only at high-risk
levels.  The  enacting  Congress  assumed  that  carcinogenic  substances
were both  rare and  extremely  dangerous.  Now, however,  carcinogenic
substances appear omnipresent, and often pose little danger.  Should the
statute be interpreted to permit de minimis exceptions in a time in which
carcinogens  can  be  detected  at  exceptionally  low  levels  posing  trivial
risks to health?
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), invoking the changed
character of scientific  knowledge, says yes; a federal court has said no.63
In the court's view, the provision  said what it meant and meant what  it
said, and that was that. But read in its context, there was no such clarity
in the Delaney Clause.  Congress simply did not focus on the question of
de minimis risks.  Indeed, it could not have done so in light of the state of
scientific  knowledge  with  respect  to  carcinogenic  substances.  It  was
therefore a  myth  to say  that the congressional  enactment  resolved the
"risk free workplace"); NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d  1146,  1164 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (restricting EPA from
considering  cost and technical feasibility  in determining  what  is "safe").
61.  See Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial  Process:  The Revisionist Role of the
Courts in Federal  Banking Regulation, 85  MICH. L. REv.  672 (1987).
62.  See supra note 5.
63.  See supra note  16.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
question in the face of unanticipated  scientific developments.  Nor can it
be said  that  the FDA's de minimis exception  "amended"  the  Clause.
The  question  is the meaning  of the clause  in light  of the new  circum-
stances.  Might the word "induce"  contain  a de minimis exception?  The
answer to that question  will inevitably  depend  on interpretation.
A more nuanced  approach  to the problem  of obsolescence  can be
found in judicial constructions of statutes of the  1920s and  1930s requir-
ing old-line agencies to take account of environmental concerns.64  Here
the legal background has changed so dramatically that what might seem
to be a straightforward  interpretation of the old statutes  would produce
incoherence.  The problem of obsolescence also helps  explain the courts'
narrow  construction  of provisions  of the  Uniform  Commercial  Code
(UCC)  that had  not anticipated  the consumer  revolution in  the law  of
products liability.65
Dean  Calabresi  has  argued  that courts  should  have  the  power  to
invalidate obsolete  statutes,  returning them  to the legislature  for recon-
sideration.66  A judicial role of this sort would be extremely  controver-
sial,  and properly so.  The principal  problem  posed by  obsolescence  or
changed  circumstances  is  that it  makes  interpretation  in  the ordinary
sense  far more  difficult.  Efforts  to translate  statutes  into new  settings
cannot be made simply  by asking what the statute meant  when  it was
enacted.  A principle that calls for courts to exercise some creativity here
provides a far less intrusive function for the courts, and it has unmistaka-
ble foundations  in current law.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The  question  whether  aggressive judicial  review  of administrative
action has produced "net benefits"  poses difficulty most notably because
of the absence of clear criteria by which to make the assessment.  Courts
have the responsibility  both to  ensure legality  and to  prevent arbitrari-
ness, and a decision to bring about compliance with the governing statute
may or may not produce more sensible regulation.  The absence  of clear
criteria and the lack of good empirical data make it exceptionally difficult
to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of aggressive judicial review.  In
the abstract, one could imagine scenarios in which such review would be
64.  See, eg.,  Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference  v. Federal  Power Comm'n,  354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir.  1965),  cert. denied, 384 U.S.  941  (1966)  (FPC licensing and  related  orders set  aside for
failure to support decision with sufficient evidence in the record and for ignoring relevant factors and
failing to analyze  possible alternatives  to  a hydroelectric  power plant project).
65.  See Peters, Common Law Judging  in a Statutory World:  An Address, 43  U.  PiTr.  L. REV.
995,  1003  (1982).
66.  See G. CALABRESI,  A COMMON  LAW  FOR  TnE AGE  OF STATUTES  146-62 (1985).
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alternatively  indispensable  and  disastrous.  Nonetheless,  there  is  some
basis for believing  that aggressive judicial review has, in many  settings,
increased  the  incidence  of  legality,  prevented  arbitrariness,  ensured
against  undesirable  regulation,  and  brought  about  regulatory  controls
that have saved lives or otherwise accomplished  considerable  good.
A major gap in current administrative law is the lack of an under-
standing of the characteristic  functions and failures of the regulatory pro-
cess,  and  a  derivative  understanding  of the judicial  role.  Sympathetic
engagement with regulatory purposes, together with a solid understand-
ing of regulatory pathologies, ultimately might lead to a set of principles
by which courts could indeed bring about "net benefits" through judicial
review.  No one should argue that the judiciary should  play the central
role in ensuring legality, rationality, or justice in the administrative pro-
cess.  But it would be difficult to deny that a judiciary suitably sensitive
to  the functions  and  failures  of the  regulatory  state  might  well  make
things better rather than worse.